Written by Lillian Gillespie
Introduction and Background
Peaceful protest and assembly have existed in Argentinian society for as long as they have been legally protected. While historical movements, such as those by the Mothers of Plaza del Mayo, have proven successful and sent powerful messages for social change, social media has enabled protests to unite faster and spread wider than ever before. As long as citizens have internet access, Argentines throughout the country have the means to organize politically. With the growth of media access, comes growth of informational sources. Argentina, like other countries, experiences instances of fake news campaigns, intentionally meant to undermine faith in government and embarrass politicians. Social media generally proves a useful tool for protest organization and freedom of expression in Argentina; however, its negative consequences include political polarization and circulation of fake news, which detracts from democracy.
In order to maintain freedom of expression, the internet remains a relatively unregulated, democratic platform in Argentina. Freedom House, an American NGO dedicated to monitoring civil rights and liberties, ranks countries annually based on internet access. A Freedom House score of one hundred indicates a country has a completely free internet but Argentina’s score of 73/100 signifies that the internet has close to no restrictions or censorship.[1] According to Freedom House, 70 percent of Argentines have access to the internet and Statista reports that 46 percent of Argentines use Twitter.[2] Taking 70% of the total population with internet (44.95 million people total, 31.47 million with internet) and 46% of the population with Twitter (20.68 million people) and divide the Twitter users by internet users, we are able to see the percentage of internet users on Twitter.[3] This operation calculates that 66% of the internet-using population in Argentina participates on Twitter. In general, Argentines have unlimited access to the internet and social media platforms, but the country’s lack of rural infrastructure and internet affordability hinders total connection.[4] Though Argentines use a plethora of applications for personal networking, politicians maintain contact with their constituents primarily via Twitter and Facebook.[5]
Previously, democracies depended on the media to set national agendas and determine which events were of political importance. Now, however, social networks have assumed that role because the public can directly share their own opinions via tweet, post, or update.[6] Social networks enable both the government and the opposition to garner support by directly appealing to the people.[7] Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and Mauricio Macri run the two most followed political Twitter accounts in Argentina, using their accounts to share news, support their parties, and undermine opposition.[8] Members of Macri’s party are less prone to the divisive populist rhetoric of the Peronists, but they still share news meant to erode the credibility of their competitors. Despite the country’s history supporting Peronist populism, the majority of Argentine citizens view change of political doctrines as a good thing and hold their politicians accountable by regularly uniting behind and voting into power opposition parties.[9] The immediacy of social media in democracy increases the responsibility of politicians to the people because it creates a direct channel for reciprocal interaction and communication.
Social Media as Democratic Mobilization
The November 8, 2012 cacerolazo protests used Twitter as an organizational tool to maintain the movement’s traction when demonstrations started to gain international attention and support. Followers used Twitter to encourage fellow citizens frustrated with the Kirchner administration to make their discontent known by banging pots and using the hashtag #8N.[10] Catalysts for the protests included increased crime levels, political corruption, and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s attempt to revise the constitution in order to run for a third term as president.[11] The #8N protests were initially nonpartisan and unified the citizenry, allowing them to express general dissatisfaction with the government. The use of social media was essential to the triumph of the #8N protest because the lack of traditional, centralized leadership made the protest accessible to every Argentinian.[12] The global trend for leaderless protests often creates strong, initial energy and then dwindling support, but #8N was sustained by street posters, social media re-tweets, and the movement’s universal, nonpartisan nature. Nevertheless, as the movement gained traction, opposition forces like Mauricio Macri endorsed the protests, contributing a political element to them.[13]
The Kirchner administration attempted to challenge the opposition by spreading an “8N Yo no voy” (8N I don’t go) counter hashtag and by denouncing the protesters as members of the ultra-right.[14] The democratic “8N yo no voy” counter protests provided citizens with a vehicle of expression, yet their dialogue polarized and isolated in an already tense political climate. Supporters gave reasons for boycotting #8N, including “yo soy argentino” and “sociedad igualitaria.”[15] While never proven, there is strong speculation that the Kirchner administration sponsored this nationalist rhetoric to bolster their image and denounce opposition.[16] Counter protestors claim to be Argentine, or to support an equal society, thus implying those that support #8N are anti-Argentine, and detract from equality. By claiming those protesting her government tried to undermine her, Kirchner characterized the demonstrations as a personal affront rather than lawful political resistance.[17] Using antagonistic speech and calling out individual critics on Twitter endangers democracy because it attempts to inhibit the freedom of expression. When opposition does not possess a platform for free speech, the government is not held liable for its actions and promises. Opposition forces constantly challenge each other in democratic governments, and dissent should be fostered, but the manners in which politicians, such as Kirchner, use their position to pressure and silence their opposition are inherently undemocratic and should prompt alarm.
Similar to the #8N protests, the death of lawyer Alberto Nisman in 2015 put Argentina in turmoil. Nisman allegedly committed suicide days before he intended to present evidence against Kirchner, potentially connecting her to the devastating 1994 Jewish AMIA bombing.[18] The demonstrations following his death were organized through social media and participants worked to maintain anonymity. This served as an effective strategy because social media users utilized Twitter to organize virtually, making the movement nonpartisan and applicable to all Argentines.[19] Despite the nonpartisan nature of the protest, the media and the PRO opposition party actively supported protesters, whereas Kirchner and her government struggled to change the narrative and gain the upper hand.[20] Peronist politicians rarely mentioned or acknowledged Nisman’s name in their tweets, angering protestors and prompting them to express their dissatisfaction in the 2015 presidential election.[21] The #Nisman protests enabled Argentines and politicians fed up with the Kirchner-run government to voice their frustration with Alberto Nisman’s convenient death and the opaque way the government handled inquiries. It became a pivotal event in the formation of an opposition coalition strong enough to overcome Kirchner’s party at the polls.
The #8N and #Nisman protests were extremely detrimental to the credibility of Kirchner’s government because not only did they draw attention to Kirchner’s proposed constitutional changes and the expediently timed death of a political threat, but they denounced the administration’s overall corruption, inflation, and crime.[22] Social media benefits democracies because it provides an outlet for citizens to freely express their frustrations. However, both government and opposition supporters tend to network and engage almost entirely with those of similar viewpoints.[23] This lack of direct engagement with opposition has been seen in Argentina, creating pervasive “information bubbles,” and political polarization and isolation.[24]
When protests such as #8N and #Nisman arise, citizens quickly take sides and use the momentum to draw attention to larger issues in society. Social media users select and omit certain hashtags from their posts helps form the specific narrative of the social movement. Members of opposition movements that use social media to spread their message tend to vastly out-tweet those that support the establishment’s position, giving them the ability to frame the protest.[25] In this way, social media helps democracy because it gives every participant the ability to contribute to the dialogue surrounding the protest. Argentine citizens use Twitter to discuss the movements and come together to make social change, regardless of geographic location.
Despite social media’s ability to democratize protests for citizens, politicians use social media to gain popularity and endorse themselves. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and members of her party used Twitter during both the 2012 and 2015 protests to discredit and undermine investigative journalists, media corporations, and Argentine citizens. She referred to an oppositional media group as a “factory of lies and political operations.”[26] This and more extreme cases of populist rhetoric on Twitter degrade Argentine democracy because they imply that the media opposes the government, trying to mobilize their constituents against the media. Kirchner is notorious for using emotional and antagonistic messages to promote discussion among her followers without personally responding to them.[27] Kirchner mimics the trend observed on populist Twitter accounts, using the platform to self-promote and confront opposition.[28] This weaponizes social media and creates an environment of conflict rather than collaboration.
Global trends demonstrate that when politicians neglect policies of good governance, whether refusing to engage with constituents or acting suspiciously, they lose their peoples’ trust and contribute to lack of faith in democracy and political polarization.[29] Healthy democratic governments do not hinder their citizens’ right to use social media to express their opinions and peacefully organize. While the #8N and #Nisman protests are democratic, the manner in which opposition treats them, either by aggressive counterattacks or by ignoring facts erodes the quality of democracy in Argentina. The absence of dialogue and engagement between the government and its opposition tends to foster political ill will and spread unsubstantiated news articles and misinformation, commonly referred to as “fake news.”
Distrust and Fake News on Social Media
Social media gives every Argentine with internet access the ability to critique and participate in democracy. Anyone can share their viewpoint by posting 280 characters or retweeting a news article. However, the ability to access information provided by Twitter comes with a cost: users may easily share and spread emotional, inflammatory, doctored click-bait. Recently, both Macri and Kirchner supporters shared videos and headlines edited to discredit the other’s leader.[30] Stories spread throughout Kirchner’s presidency claiming she had offshore accounts, used state money to buy her daughter an apartment, and paid one of her ministers a second salary.[31] Attempts to discredit Macri targeted his Security Minister, Patricia Bullrich, via a doctored video portraying her as intoxicated.[32]
It is worth noting that the article “Argentine Media Regulation, Fake News, and the Election of Mauricio Macri” may contain pro-Kirchner bias, as it fails to mention the numerous occasions that Kirchner and the Peronist party also spread fake news to discredit Macri and the media. Furthermore, De Maio makes generalizations about Macri voters, insinuating that they believe everything pro-Macri journalists, such as Jorge Lanata, write.[33] Kirchner was both a victim of fake news and a culprit of its propagation, showing that neither side is immune from spreading fake news about their rivals and that Argentines should be suspicious of every inflammatory, politically motivated tweet they read. Click-bait and fabricated stories are especially dangerous when sources purported to be credible share them. Social media makes it incredibly easy to share information as soon as events occur, but it is the duty of Argentine journalists and public figures to protect their integrity by fact-checking stories before sharing them.
Studying fake news and the automation of social media usage would not be complete without mentioning the abundance of automatically generated messages (nicknamed “bots”) that abound in the Argentine Twitter sphere. Although researchers measured significantly fewer bots involved in the #Nisman protests, than in the 2015 election, during the election both Mauricio Macri and Daniel Scioli accused each other of using fake accounts to flood Twitter with self-promotional messages.[34] Bots retweeted messages from candidates to amplify the appearance of popular support and dependability. Scioli used bots to create many accounts that immediately retweeted his campaign messages.[35] Meanwhile, Macri took a more professional approach, blending bots with legitimate activity of campaign supporters.[36] While Argentinian bots lack the refinement and believability possessed by those created in countries like Russia and Mexico, they still threaten democracy. Bots engineered to spread one-sided information on relevant news articles are dangerous because naïve Twitter users often feed into and believe the propaganda they read. If unable to discern a bot from a real tweet, Argentines may be influenced to believe electoral propaganda. This takes away the ability for citizens to attain truthful information and make informed votes.
The difficulty with discerning real and fake news has made media consumers distrustful of information sources. In Argentina specifically, media conglomerates often monopolize information because few legal restrictions on distribution exist.[37] This relates to social media as well, because unsubstantiated articles shared on social media platforms inform opinions of Argentine citizens. Aruguete and Calvo found that social media serves as the second biggest provider of news to the Argentine public, trailing only television.[38] When citizens do not trust democratic institutions, “governments are unable to tackle difficult policy problems.”[39] Lack of trust in the main pillars of democracy threatens the entire system. Despite highly contested, polarized elections, voters’ dedication and smooth transitions of power provide stability to Argentina’s democracy. Constituents held Cristina Fernández de Kirchner accountable for her alleged corruption and role in Nisman’s death in 2015 by uniting behind the candidacy of Mauricio Macri. In the October 27, 2019 Macri lost his bid for reelection, showing voters’ dissatisfaction with his handling of the recent economic crisis.[40]
As seen in Argentina, people share stories that validate their own beliefs and undermine the credibility of those with whom they disagree. Politicians that engage in this system of communication use their influence to discredit the people they oppose, rather than their policies. For years yellow journalism—sensational and exaggerated news—influenced public opinion and created exaggerated stories to gain readers, however, the scale of fake news today is more detrimental to society and democracy. The format by which news is spread allows anyone to write and instantaneously share their opinions as fact. When mechanisms like bots support social media, they make it harder to discern credible sources and support from propaganda and misleading information. When fabricated popularity contests drown out the voices of genuine citizens, they obscure the will of the majority and the premise of democracy.
Conclusion
Manifestations of civil discontent are not new in democratic societies, however the rise in access to the internet and in coverage of social media has made protest coordination easier. The #8N and #Nisman protests represent social media’s success at uniting people for social change. The protests did not cause discontent but were manifestations of frustrations with larger societal issues faced by Argentine citizens. Social media use should not be inhibited, as it provides an avenue for freedom of speech and expression. As the internet spreads in Argentina, citizens will continue to connect with one another, making protests even more widely accessible. More citizens with internet accessibility will mean that there are more voices to contribute to the cacophony on social media. In the post-truth digital society, it is essential to remain vigilant and source-check before believing falsified articles and automated posts attempting to further divide democratic societies. It will be interesting to see whether Cristina Fernández de Kirchner will return to her habit of antagonistic tweeting in her new role as Vice President, or if President-elect Alberto Fernández and younger party members will bear that torch.
[1] “Freedom on the Net 2017: Argentina,” Freedom House, last modified 2017.
[2] Stéphanie Chevalier, “Leading social media platforms in Argentina as of 3rd quarter 2018,” Statista, last modifiedFebruary 28, 2019.
[3] World Bank, “Population Total—Argentina,” World Bank Group.
[4] “Freedom on the Net 2017: Argentina,” Freedom House.
[5] Silvio Waisbord and Adriana Amado, “Populist communication by digital means: presidential Twitter in Latin America” Information, Communication & Society 20, no. 9 (2017): 1335.
[6] M. Carballo et. al, “Communication, Public Opinion, and Democracy: New Challenges,” Communication and Society 31, no. 4 (2018): 130.
[7] Natalia Aruguete and Ernesto Calvo, “Time to #Protest: Selective Exposure, Cascading Activation, and Framing in Social Media,” Journal of Communication 68, no. 3 (June 2018): 485.
[8] Raquel Tarullo, “Why do Argentine Politicians Use Social Media?” University College London (May 7, 2015).
[9] Mariana de Maio, “Argentine Media Regulation, Fake News, and the Election of Mauricio Macri,”
[10] Gabriela Garton, “#8N: Tweeting for Change in Argentina,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs, last modified November 8, 2012.
[11] CNN Wire Staff, “Demonstrators Bang Pots, Pans to Protest Argentina’s Policies,” CNN, last modified November 9, 2012.
[12] Garton, “#8N: Tweeting for Change.”
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Laura Serra, “’8N Yo no voy,’ la campaña web para neutralizar el efecto del carcerolazo,” La Nación, last modified November 6, 2012.
[16] Waisbord and Amado, “Populist Communication by Digital Means,” 1341.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Tanya Filer and Rolf Fredheim, “Sparking Debate? Political Deaths and Twitter Discourses in Argentina and Russia,” Information, Communication, & Society 19, no. 11 (2016): 1540.
[19] Juan Pablo Ferrero, “Argentina Protests: Middle Class Marchers Move in the Shadows—and on Social Media,” The Conversation, last modified February 25, 2015.
[20] Filer and Fredheim, “Sparking Debate,” 1542.
[21] Filer and Fredheim, “Sparking Debate,” 1550.
[22] CNN Wire Staff, “Demonstrators Bang Pots, Pans.” Ferrero, “Argentina Protests.”
[23] Arguete and Calvo, “Time to #Protest,” 488.
[24] Ibid, 498.
[25] Ibid, 487.
[26] Waisbord and Amado, “Populist Communication by Digital Means,” 1339.
[27] Ibid, 1338. Tarullo, “Why do Argentine Politicians Use Social Media?”
[28] Waisbord and Amado, “Populist Communication by Digital Means,” 1341.
[29] Elad Klein and Joshua Robinson, “Like, Post, and Distrust? How Social Media Use Affects Trust in Government,” Political Communications, (October 16, 2019): 3.
[30] Lucas Robinson, “Fake News Persists in Argentina as Election Draws Near,” Buenos Aires Times, last modified September 14, 2019.
[31] De Maio, “Argentine Media Regulation, Fake News,” 11.
[32] Robinson, “Fake News Persists.”
[33] De Maio, “Argentine Media Regulation, Fake News,” 13.
[34] Tanya Filer and Rolf Fredheim, “Popular with the Robots: Accusation and Automation in the Argentine Presidential Elections, 2015,” International Journal of Politics, Culture, & Society 30, no. 3 (September 2017): 260.
[35] Ibid, 268.
[36] Ibid.
[37] De Maio, “Argentine Media Regulation, Fake News,” 14.
[38] Arguete and Calvo, “Time to #Protest,” 485.
[39] Klein and Robinson, “Like, Protest, and Distrust?” 2.
[40] Cristina J. Orgaz, “Elecciones en Argentina: cómo heredó Macri la economia del país y cómo la deja,” BBC, last modified October 28, 2019.
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